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Abstract: The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the multidimensional challenges inhibiting 
the fight against corruption in Nigeria. With emphasis on litigation as a tool for fighting corruption, 
the paper reveals factors that contribute to corruption in Nigeria and efforts being made to combat it. 
It evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness of the legal framework and prosecution of corruption 
cases in Nigeria. The paper argues that the failure of the Nigerian State to effectively combat 
corruption is not attributable to inadequate or lack of enabling legal framework. While recognizing 
the right of persons standing trial for corruption to a fair trial and meaningful day in court, it also 
highlights various challenges confronting defence counsel before and during trial of persons standing 
trial for corruption. Finally, the paper recommends how corruption can be controlled in Nigeria.  
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1. Introduction 
Corruption has permeated every fabric of the Nigerian nation. Various 
governments have fought the crime for decades
3
 with little success. Corruption has 
been acknowledged as the only steady growth Nigeria has experienced since her 
Independence. Corruption is a hydra-headed monster with the capacity to destroy 
every facet of life. The virus of corrupt practices is devastating on every aspect of 
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the economy
1
; it promotes authoritarian and oligarchic rule because it ensures that 
wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of a few to the detriment of the 
silent suffering majority. Corruption compromises the fortune of future generations 
of a corrupt nation. The effect of corruption was admirably summed up by a former 
Chairman of the Economic and Financial Commission Crime: 
The corruption endemic to our region is not just about bribery, but about 
mismanagement, incompetence, abuse of office, and the inability to establish 
justice and the rule of law. As resources are stolen, confidence not just in 
democratic governance but in the idea of just leadership ebbs away. As the lines 
of authority with the government erode, so too do traditional authority structures. 
In the worst cases, eventually, all that is left to hold society together is the idea 
that someday it may be your day to get yours. This does little to build credible, 
accountable institutions of governance or put the right policies in place. 
The African Union has reported that corruption drains the region of some $140 
Billion a year, which is about 25% of the continent’s official GDP… between 
1960 and 1999, Nigerian officials had stolen or wasted more than $440 billion. 
This is six times the Marshall plan, the total sum needed to rebuild a devastated 
Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. When you look across a nation 
and a continent riddled with poverty and weak institutions, and you think of what 
this money could have done- only then can you truly understand the crime of 
corruption, and the almost inhuman indifference that is required by those who 
wield it for personal gain… I stand by the idea that corruption is responsible for as 
many deaths as the combined results of conflicts and HIV/AIDS on the African 
continent. (Ribadu, 2009) 
                                                          
1 The UN’s top anti-crime official, Antonio Costa, identifies  Zaire and Nigeria as two of Africa”s 
hardest-hit states, having lost some $5 billion each in the last few years to graft, most of it spirited out 
of both countries. In Pakistan, an estimated 30 percent of the price of all public works projects is 
dedicated to kickbacks and bribes. In Bangladesh, corruption consumes a whopping 50 percent of 
foreign investment. As high as that price tag stands, there are even more alarming activities, what 
officials call the intermingling of terrorism, money laundering and corruption. “The routes for arms 
trafficking and drugs are usually lubricated by corruption,” Costa said. He estimated that about one-
quarter of the $2 billion in annual proceeds from Afghan heroin trade – a trade that couldn”t survive 
without graft – may be used to finance terrorism. Corruption also represents “a tax on the poor… it 
steals from the needy to enrich the wealthy,” “ Ashcroft told the convention in Merida, Mexico City. 
That is especially true in Africa and Asia, two regions which have never signed such a pact before, 
where embezzled money is usually sent abroad to a rich banking capital:” M. Stevenson, “UN 
Countries Reveal Costs of Corruption” (Johannesburg: Associated Press, 2003) 
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Corruption has also been associated with the destruction of the soul of the society; 
inequality in the society; and hindrance to effective legal system. Nigeria’s former 
President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo has rightly observed: All of us know that the 
scourge of corruption has eaten so deeply in to the fabrics of public and private 
transactions in our country, that it had become impossible to contemplate and plan 
for our generation without first tackling it. It is not only illegal; it is bad because it 
corrupts the very soul of our community. It makes nonsense of all our inadequate 
resources. It breeds cynicism and promotes inequality. It renders it almost 
impossible for this administration to address the objectives of equity and justice in 
our society with any seriousness. And finally, it destroys the social fabric of our 
society leaving each individual on his own, to do only whatever, is best for 
himself.
1
 
Corruption is the most devastating crime and a precursor of all other crimes 
(Adeyemi, 1998, p. 3). Corruption is not only anti-people; it targets the very 
vulnerable in the society. Corruption is pervasive in both the public and the private 
sectors and has indeed become a “cankerworm reaching the dimension of epidemic 
in our body politic (Adeyemi, 1998, p. 3).” A society that tolerates corruption will 
definitely be regressive and isolated from the comity of civilized countries 
(Osipitan & Oyewo, 1999, pp. 257-282). This explains why all hands must be on 
deck in the fight against corruption. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the multidimensional challenges 
inhibiting the fight against corruption in Nigeria.  It focuses on litigation as a tool 
for fighting corruption. The paper reveals factors that contribute to corruption in 
Nigeria and the efforts being made to combat it. It evaluates the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the legal framework for the prosecution of cases of corruption in 
Nigeria. It argues that the failure of the Nigerian state to effectively tackle 
corruption is not due to inadequate or lack of enabling legal framework but a 
combination of lack of political will, institutional failures, and institutional 
corruption that ubiquitously pervade the Nigerian State. The paper recognizes the 
rights of persons standing trial for corruption to a fair trial and meaningful day in 
court. Against this background, the paper examines the challenges confronting 
defence counsel before and during trial of persons standing trial for corruption. 
Finally, the paper recommends some measures to enhance the performance of the 
defence counsel. 
                                                          
1 O. Obasanjo being a remark at the inauguration ceremony of the Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) 2000. 
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This paper is divided into five parts. Part one is introductory. Part two defines 
relevant conceptual terms. Part three highlights the challenges of combating 
corruption in Nigeria. Part four x-rays the problems confronting defence counsel 
engaged by persons accused of corruption. Part five concludes with suggestions. 
 
2. Conceptual Terms 
2.1. Corruption 
Under the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000,
1
  
“corruption” is defined to include “bribery, fraud and other related offences”. 
Adeyemi describes corruption as “an offence which aims mainly at the conduct of 
public officials who take advantage of their positions within public administrations 
for the purpose of private gains (Adeyemi, 1998, p. 5). Bello gives a wider 
definition of corruption. He describes it as an “aspect of human endeavour, which 
is looked upon as obnoxious, mean, degrading, odious, and offensive to the higher 
norms of any respectable human society” (Bello, 1991). Adegbite describes 
corruption as moral deterioration, depravity and perversion of integrity by bribery 
or favour, in its widest sense. Therefore, corruption connotes the perversion of 
anything from its original state of purity, a kind of infection or infected condition. 
Corruption in this down-to-earth sense means acting or inducing an act with the 
intent of improperly securing advantage. (Adegbite, p. 213) 
One of the reasons, for the under-development of Nigeria and the failure of public 
institutions is widespread corruption, and lack of accountability to the people. 
There is systemic corruption in both the public and the private sectors which have 
resulted in the total subversion of the system. It is no gainsaying that on account of 
the devastating effect of corruption and the negative impact on the people, “all 
Nigerians except perhaps those who benefit from it are unhappy with the level of 
corruption in the country”. (Ogwuegbu, 2002, p. 67) 
  
                                                          
1 Act No. 5 of 2004, s. 2. 
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2.2. Defence Counsel 
A defence counsel would normally represent the accused at pre-trial, trial, and 
post-trial stages. If there is need to enter a plea bargain, the defence counsel would 
normally negotiate with the prosecution on behalf of the accused. The defence 
counsel owes the accused the duty to familiarize himself with various information 
or charge filed by the prosecutor against the accused person. The defence counsel 
should know what each count means and why it has been brought against the 
accused. He must build a case, and anticipate the argument the prosecution will use 
to convict the accused. He must then take each anticipated argument and 
effectively defend the accused person. Where briefed, the defence counsel 
represents the accused person at the pre-trial stage. He represents the accused 
person during interrogation by investigating officers and other persons 
investigating the offence. Where necessary, the defence counsel files application 
for the trial and post-trial bail on behalf of the accused person. Where bail is 
granted it is the defence counsel who makes recommendation to the court on the 
suitability of the sureties. 
However, despite being briefed as the defence counsel, the defence counsel 
primarily remains an officer of the Court and a Minister in the Temple of Justice. 
Accordingly, his duty is principally to the court.  As rightly observed by Flowers:  
all lawyers, no matter what area of law, have a responsibility that goes beyond 
merely advocating for the client. An attorney must act as an officer of the court, 
respecting the need for the truth and truth-seeking within the confines of the 
adversary system and as an active participant of a system that places justice as a 
core value. (Flowers, 2010, p. 647) 
 
3. Challenges Of Combating Corruption 
There is no doubt that the legal framework on corruption in Nigeria is robust and 
adequate (ibidem) However, there is lack of political will and effective 
enforcement mechanism. The fight against corruption requires full and open 
support of the Federal Government and other government institutions. A fight 
against corruption is a fight against few oligarchies with immense resources to 
fight back. The machinery for the enforcement of anti-corruption laws must 
therefore be potent. The battle against corruption must be continually sustained.  
JURIDICA 
 
 76 
The Nigerian Police Force, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as 
well as the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission 
are the agencies primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
corruption cases. We will inquire into the modus operandi of these three agencies 
below. 
 
3.1. Corruption within the Nigerian Police Force 
It is definitely true that the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) plays a vital role in 
criminal justice administration in Nigeria. The NPF is primarily responsible for the 
enforcement of laws in Nigeria. It is evidently not immune from the cancer of 
corruption which plagues the larger society. It is common knowledge that 
corruption within the NPF is endemic and institutional. The agency has been 
described as an army of corruption (Abati, 2001, p. 15). The flip side to this is that 
potential whistle-blowers are discouraged because of lack of confidence in the 
ability of the NPF to bring corrupt officials to justice. As appropriately observed by 
the ICPC, “the impact of this realization may further be compounded by the 
knowledge that corruption in the police can invert the goals of the organisation to 
the extent that police powers encourage and create crime, rather than deter it”.1 The 
NPF is perceived as brutal and unfriendly. As rightly noted by the ICPC: Where 
police deviance ends and corruption begins is sometimes difficult to determine. 
Brutality, discrimination, sexual harassment, intimidation and illicit use of weapons 
constitute deviant behaviour. If it is designed to achieve personal wants it also 
characterizes itself as corrupt. But corrupt behaviour as understood by the ordinary 
Nigerian probably consists of (i) pay-offs to the police by essentially law abiding 
citizens for infringements of statutes such as traffic laws, (ii) pay-off to the police 
by organized crime or individuals who habitually break the law to make money 
such as drug dealers or prostitutes, (iii) the receipt of money, favours or discounts 
for services rendered, (iv) pocketing recovered money from proceeds of crime, (v) 
giving false testimony to ensure dismissal of cases in court and (vi) the actual 
perpetration of criminal acts, to mention a few. The danger apparent is that in 
extreme cases, police are not just “protecting” criminals, but have become a 
complicit part in the planning and execution of crimes.  
                                                          
1 ICPC, “Combating Corruption in the Nigerian Police Force” (being a paper presented by the 
Independent Corrupt Practices & other Related Offences Commission at the Police Service 
Commission Retreat in August 2008), p. 4, available online at: 
<http://www.psc.gov.ng/files/Combatting>   
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It is not surprising that the Police Force lacks a rich history of successful 
prosecution of top government officials for corruption (Alemeka, 1998, p. 161). 
The law enforcement agency has not only embraced corruption; a culture of 
corruption thrives within the Nigerian Police Force (Aremu, 2009). An institution 
such as the Nigerian Police Force that symbolises corruption cannot successfully 
combat corruption. Apart from embracing corruption, the agency lacks the requisite 
capacity to deal with 21
st
 century challenges of investigating criminals and suspects 
(Odekunle, 1979, pp. 61-68). 
The role of the police in the investigation and prosecution of crime is statutorily 
defined. S. 4 of the Police Act
1
 provides that: The Police shall be employed for the 
prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation 
of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all 
laws and regulation… 
S. 23 of the Police Act provides that the police shall conduct investigations in 
criminal matters subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The prosecutorial 
powers of the Nigerian Police Force have been upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Osahon v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.
2
 
The powers of the Nigerian Police Force to prosecute State and Federal Offences 
whether in the name of the State Commissioner of Police, Inspector General of 
Police or in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the State or Federal 
High Court was upheld in the above case. The only restriction in the prosecutorial 
powers of the Nigerian Police Force is the overriding powers of a State or Federal 
Attorney-General as the case may be, to take over or discontinue proceedings 
commenced by legal officers and prosecutors at the Nigerian Police Force. 
 
3.2. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)  
The EFCC has wide powers. It has the power to investigate, arrest and prosecute 
any person accused of economic and financial crimes in public and private sectors. 
The EFCC Act places a bar on interlocutory appeals at the trial court
3
. The Act 
seems to have shifted the burden of proof in cases of the offence of unjust 
                                                          
1 Cap. P19 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
2 (2006) 2 SCNJ 157. 
3 S. 40. 
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enrichment to the accused.
1
 The Act also gives the EFCC the power to apply to 
court for interim restraint/forfeiture of properties suspected to have been acquired 
with proceeds of crime
2
. Consequently, the EFCC arraigned about 300 persons and 
had 92 convictions between 2003 and 2006.
3
 It is noteworthy that the EFCC 
secured the conviction of a handful of senior government officials. Former public 
office holders like Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, Tafa Balogun, Lucky Igbinedion, 
Bode George and others have been found guilty and convicted of corrupt practices 
by competent courts. However, it is generally agreed that the EFCC enforcement 
and investigation officers are involved in high-handedness, arm-twisting, and 
forcing and inducing accused persons to plea-bargain. 
A. However, successful prosecution of offenders for corruption at the instance of 
the EFCC is remarkable when compared with the failure rate of the Nigerian Police 
Force. The point must also be made that the success rate of EFCC and ICPC is 
traceable to the plea bargains of the convicts. With the exception of Lagos State,
4
 
none of the States of the Federation has expressly recognized plea bargaining in its 
criminal process. The former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Dahiru Musdaher, was 
recently reported
5
 to have stated that plea bargain is illegal, fraudulent and not part 
of the Nigerian criminal process. This pronouncement is most unfortunate as it is 
likely to slow down the rate of successful prosecution and conviction of persons 
accused of corruption.The Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission 
(ICPC) 
S. 6 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2004 (the ICPC Act) 
2004 authorises the ICPC to receive, investigate complaint, and prosecute anyone 
suspected of corrupt practices. The ICPC enjoys wide powers. As at October 2008, 
the number of corruption cases stood at 161.
6
 The rate of conviction was however 
abysmally low. Only 22 convictions had been secured. This may not be 
unconnected with limited coverage of the ICPC Act. It provides that the ICPC can 
                                                          
1 S. 19(2). 
2 Ss. 26-29. 
3 N. Ribadu, “Combating Money Laundering in Emerging Economies: Nigeria as a Case Study” 
(Guest Lecture Series Financial Institutions Training Centre/ Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairs, Lagos, 10 August 2006). 
4 Only the Lagos State Government has formally introduced plea bargaining into its criminal justice 
system. See the Administration of Criminal Justice Law 2007, s. 75. None of those prosecuted and 
convicted by the EFCC was convicted under this law. 
5 Justice Dahiru Musdapher, “Plea Bargaining has no Place in Our Laws,” available online at: 
<http://www.punchng.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=4789:plea-bargain-has-no-
place-in-our-law-–-cjn&Itemid=542>  
6 ICPC Monitor, Vol. 1, Issue 5 (August - October 2008), p. 34. 
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only investigate corruption involving public officers. These corrupt acts must have 
also occurred after the inauguration of ICPC(Enweremadu, 2010, p. 8). 
The ICPC team of investigating officers includes police specialists in the detection 
of crime, lawyers, accountants, financial experts, and other specially trained 
experts. This is commendable because investigation and successful prosecution of 
offences of corruption require expertise and experience of economic and financial 
complexities that are definitely beyond the capacities of police officers. 
B. Common Issues with Enforcement Officers 
The investigating pattern and operations of the three major anti-corruption 
enforcement bodies are highlighted below. The Nigerian Police Force, Independent 
Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Economic 
and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) are examined against the backdrop of 
determining the efficacy of their investigating techniques. 
It is not uncommon for prosecutors to file charges which are completely unrelated 
to the proof of evidence. Mis-joinder of offences, mis-joinder of offenders, poor 
investigation techniques, inability to immediately secure and protect crime scene, 
harassment of the accused persons and their counsel and protracted pre-trial 
detentions are vices which are common to these three enforcement agencies. In 
some cases, arrests are made and charges are filed in court before conclusion of 
investigations. The result is that the trial of accused persons run concurrently with 
the investigation of the crimes in respect of which the accused persons are being 
tried. As rightly observed by Enweremadu: 
Evidently, there is a grave problem with the quality of investigations. The reasons 
include inadequacy in terms of quality of human resources and expertise available 
for investigations, as well as funding and necessary equipment. An overarching 
issue in the investigation of many of the high profile cases is itself indicative of 
weakness in the caliber of leadership of the police force and its lack of 
independence. (Enweremadu, 2010, p. 8) 
Anti-corruption enforcement agencies need to develop effective crime prevention 
techniques through the use of technology, intelligence-led policing and community 
policing to combat corruption. It must be remembered that corruption is a well 
organized profession and pastime for its perpetrators. In most cases, they are ahead 
of investigators. Enforcement agencies must develop capacities to out-match their 
adversaries in the fight against corruption. A situation where accused persons are 
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better informed and well ahead of investigators in terms of human and material 
resources hinders the battle against corruption. 
The fight against corruption requires huge material and human resources during 
investigations and trial stages. Investigators might need to travel within and outside 
the country to trace ill-gotten wealth.  All hands must therefore be on deck to 
adequately equip the prosecutors and investigators.  They must be trained and re-
trained “in the area of (1) management of individual caseloads, (2) proper 
examination of the elements of crime, (3) drafting of charges, (4) prosecutorial 
tactics and strategy, (5) preparation and management of witnesses.”1 
Instructions to law enforcement agencies to prosecute and persecute perceived 
political opponents and instructions to law enforcement agencies not to arrest or 
prosecute friends of powerful and well connected government officials are 
examples of common problems with law enforcement agencies by government. As 
rightly observed:   
More damaging to the anti-corruption effort of the Obasanjo administration was an 
observable tendency to employ these anti-corruption agencies, especially the 
EFCC, as a weapon of destroying political rivals. This became more noticeable as 
the second term of President Obasanjo drew to a close. The crusade against 
corruption, and anti-corruption agencies by extension, at one time even became an 
instrument for disqualifying unwanted political aspirants and paving the way for 
the smooth election of Obasanjo’s chosen candidates into the various elective 
offices. The best known example was the widely criticized bid to prosecute 
Obasanjo’s Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, and his close political and business 
associates over allegations of corruption. The political motives in the EFCC’s case 
against Atiku Abubakar were underlined by the provisions of section 137 (1) (i) of 
the Nigerian Constitution which states that any person indicted for corruption 
cannot stand in any election in Nigeria, and of course the haste with which the 
EFCC’s report indicting Atiku Abubakar was accepted and gazetted by Obasanjo 
was known to be strongly opposed to his participation in the 2007 presidential 
elections.  This action was taken just few weeks to the election. 
Happily, the Supreme Court rose to the occasion by holding in Abubakar v. 
Attorney-General of Federation 
2
 that the EFCC lacks the power to pronounce a 
                                                          
1 National Judicial Institute, Communiqué on “Corruption Casework Policy Roundtable” (July 2010), 
Para 9.  
2  (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt 1035) 117 at 155. 
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citizen who has not been tried and found guilty of corruption by a court of 
competent jurisdiction as corrupt. 
 
4. Challenges of Defending Accused Persons 
4.1. Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is a criminal process that has the reputation of being a very potent 
tool in the fight against corruption. In some jurisdictions, plea bargaining has been 
used as a tool for quick and effective resolution of corruption cases. It is 
noteworthy that despite the use of plea bargaining by the EFCC, there is no express 
provision for plea bargaining in its enabling law.  The provision relevant to plea 
bargaining is S.14 (2) of the EFCC Act which provides that: subject to the 
provisions of section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999 which relates to the power of the Attorney General of the Federation to 
institute, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings against any persons in any 
court of law, the Commission may compound any offence punishable under this 
Act by accepting such terms of money as it thinks fit, not exceeding the amount of 
the maximum fine to which that person would have been liable if he had been 
convicted of the offence.  
Interestingly, the above provision does not give unfettered power to the EFCC to 
enter into plea bargaining with the accused person.
1
 
A former Chief Justice of Nigeria recently disapproved of plea bargaining. He said, 
“Plea bargain is a novel concept of dubious origin. It has no place in our law - 
substantive or procedural. It was invented to provide soft landing to high profile 
criminals who loot the treasury entrusted to them. It is an obstacle to our fight 
against corruption. It should never again be mentioned in our jurisprudence” 
(Musdapher)
2
 The use of plea bargain by the EFCC is coercive, arm-twisting and 
discriminatorily applied and restricted to the famous and the rich to the exclusion 
of the common criminal.
3
 Professor Oyebode rightly notes: the expectations of 
some lawyers that plea bargaining would be cost-effective and help de-clog the 
                                                          
1 Tafa Balogun v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 324) 190. 
2 Available online at: 
<http://www.punchng.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=4789:plea-bargain-has-no-
place-in-our-law-–-cjn&Itemid=542> . 
3 Those who have benefitted from EFCC plea bargaining include Tafa Balogun, Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha, and Lucky Igbinedion. 
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judicial system are apt to receive a hard hearing in a society where a common goat 
or yam thief goes to jail while the white or blue collar criminal is given a mere 
symbolic sentence, most of which is either served in pleasurable surroundings or 
offered the opportunity of fines in lieu of incarceration. Admittedly, popular 
perceptions and perspectives of justice hardly ever coincide with those of the ruling 
class, especially in a society comprising the haves and have-nots. Yet, there is a felt 
need for forging a commonality of moral values in relation to the iniquity of unjust 
enrichment, double standards of justice as well as selective enforcement of laws 
and regulations.  
A society in which majority of the population are not sure of their daily bread 
would be hard put to justify plea bargaining in cases of the rich, powerful and the 
famous. It is for this reason that one cannot be overly optimistic about the fortunes 
of plea bargaining in Nigeria.
1
 
Notwithstanding the discriminatory use of plea bargaining and the emerging 
criticisms, from the view point of quick dispensation of justice, avoidance of 
expenses of conducting criminal trials and decongestion of courts lists, there are 
reasons to support plea bargaining. 
We, however, submit that plea bargaining should be well structured as an integral 
part of the criminal justice system, and made available to all, particularly the first 
offenders, irrespective of class, origin, sex, age, religion, and other extraneous 
considerations. This paper suggests that to be effective, plea bargaining should be 
statutorily regulated and proper procedure for its adoption stipulated. An example 
may be drawn from S. 75 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos 
State which provides that: Notwithstanding anything in this Law or in any other 
law, the Attorney General of the state shall have power to consider and accept a 
plea bargain from a person charged with any offence where the Attorney General is 
of the view that the acceptance of such plea bargain is in the public interest, the 
interest of justice, and the need to prevent those of legal process.
2
 
 
  
                                                          
1 A. Oyebode, “Plea Bargaining, Public Service Rules and Criminal Justice in Nigeria” (being a paper 
presented at the seminar organized by the Association of Senior Civil Servants at Banilux Events 
Place, Lagos on 9 December 2010). 
2 S. 76(1) provides elaborate procedure for plea and sentence agreements. 
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4.2. Pre-Trial and Trial Rights of Accused Persons 
Nigeria has embraced the adversary criminal process. Unlike the inquisitorial trial 
process, the accused under the adversary trial process is presumed innocent.
1
 
Accordingly, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused 
person beyond reasonable doubt. But presumption of innocence is hardly reflected 
during pre-trial stage. Many inmates awaiting trial are effectively presumed guilty 
despite the fact that there is little evidence of their involvement in the crime which 
they are accused of committing. Nigerian government is simply not complying 
with its national and international obligations when it comes to criminal justice.
2
 
Pre-trial detention of suspects by the EFCC and the Nigerian Police Force has 
assumed an alarming proportion. Accused persons are forced to remain in 
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in violation of their right to human dignity 
(Osinbajo, 2009). 
The criminal justice system suffers huge credibility crises when politically exposed 
persons are arrested, detained, and handcuffed, bundled to detention for 
unreasonable length of time. This process is vulnerable to corrupt practices by the 
law enforcement agencies, because it involves less scrutiny and the exercise of 
huge discretion by officers at the lower level of the system.
3
 The trauma of suspects 
is well captured by the UN special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment. According to the report,  pre-trial detainees, 
“are held in overcrowded cells, lacking appropriate hygiene facilities, with 
insufficient places to sleep, inadequate and/or insufficient food, water, and medical 
care, let alone any opportunities for educational, leisure, or vocational training.” 
(Wowak, 2007, p. 16) 
A striking feature of the adversary process is the pre-trial and trial right of the 
accused person to remain silent even where his silence is inconsistent with his 
innocence. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria specifically 
confirms the right of the accused person to remain silent until he has consulted with 
a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice.
4
 The pre-trial rights of 
suspects to the guiding hands of counsel during interrogation by officials of the 
EFCC, ICPC and other agencies involved in the interrogation of suspects has 
                                                          
1 S. 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution. 
2 See ICCPR, art. 9 (1). 
3 Open Society Foundations, “The Socioeconomic Impact of Pre-trial Detention” (a Report by the 
Open Society Initiative and the UNDP, New York, 2007), p 16. 
4 S. 36 (6) (c). 
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remained utopian. Counsel are seldom allowed to witness interrogation of suspects. 
Where counsel are allowed to be present during the interrogation, they can only be 
seen and not heard. Counsel invariably are compelled to blow muted trumpet 
during interrogation of suspects. Suspects are in effect denied the guiding hands of 
counsel during interrogation. The inability of counsel to assist their clients at the 
pre-trial stage of interrogation is a major challenge confronting counsel who defend 
persons accused of corruption.  
It is respectfully submitted that denial of access to or assistance of counsel during 
interrogation of suspects is a violation of the fundamental right of the accused 
person to counsel of his choice. Such denial, it is further submitted, should render 
the confessional statement made by a suspect during interrogation without the 
assistance of counsel or, where such is present but is disallowed by interrogators 
from assisting the accused person, inadmissible. It is now trite that confessional 
statements obtained as a result of threat, inducement or promise made to suspects 
or as a result of oppression of the suspects during their interrogation are generally 
inadmissible. However, the admissibility or inadmissibility of confessional 
statements obtained in violation of the constitutional right of the accused persons to 
remain silent until he has consulted with his counsel has not arisen for 
determination by our apex court. It is suggested that a confession made in violation 
of the right of the accused to the guiding hands of counsel of his choice during 
interrogation should be held as inadmissible. 
 
4.3. Quashing of Charges and Information  
Information and charges are the originating processes filed by the prosecution in 
criminal cases. These processes are expected to inform the accused person of the 
particulars of the allegations against him as well as the law allegedly breached by 
him or her. In cases of trials in the High courts where information are filed, the 
prosecution is expected to attach proof of evidence. Such proof frequently includes 
statements of witnesses the prosecution intends to call and documents which are to 
be tendered by the prosecution. An accused person served with such charge or 
information may challenge its validity or the jurisdiction of the court to try him or 
her. Alternatively, he may allege that the information is oppressive. Finally, the 
accused may contend that the proof of evidence, when read along with the 
information or charge, discloses no triable offences as to justify being put to trial. 
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Defence counsel who seek to quash or challenge the validity of a charge or 
information are faced with many challenges. Firstly, there is the problem of 
whether the accused person who has been served with criminal summons and who 
is challenging the jurisdiction of the court to try the charge is expected to 
physically appear in court notwithstanding his objection to the jurisdiction of the 
court. Secondly, where the accused so appears in court,  there is the question 
whether when the case is mentioned, he must enter into the dock or decline to enter 
the dock on the ground that he is objecting to the jurisdiction of the court to try 
him. Where he enters the dock, there is also the question of whether the charge or 
information should be read to him, whether he is obliged to make a plea or his plea 
can be arrested. There is also the issue of whether the objection to the court’s 
jurisdiction would first be argued and determined before the plea of the accused is 
taken. Finally, there is the issue of whether the accused, who, at objection stage, is 
not on trial, must still remain in the dock, during argument on the court’s 
jurisdiction to try him or her. 
A survey of case law and statutory provisions shows that the situation is unclear. 
While some statutes insist that objection to the jurisdiction of the court to try the 
accused should be taken before the plea, others prescribe that such objection should 
be taken after the plea
1
. Some statutes are silent on the issue of objection to the 
court’s jurisdiction and the physical presence (in court) of an accused person who 
is challenging the jurisdiction of the court to try him or her. Other statutes simply 
focus on objection as to the form of a charge. For example, the Administration of 
Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State specifically provides that objection as to 
defects of the charge can only be taken after the prosecution has closed the case
2
. 
The golden question is, why subject the accused person to the rigours of trial where 
there are objections capable of terminating the charge ab initio? Precious judicial 
time, and those of prosecuting and defence counsel are wasted by the above 
provision which forecloses the possibility of challenging an Information or charge 
at the earliest opportunity. It is evident that where an information or charge is 
destined to failure, in any event, it seems reasonable that such information or 
charge be challenged and quashed at the earliest opportunity. From the view point 
of challenges of defence counsel, he is expected to examine the various options in 
                                                          
1 See Edet v State (2008) 14 NWLR (Part 1106) 52 where the court held that the accused does not 
have to enter the dock before the plea. Cf  Criminal Procedure Act (CPA), ss. 67 and 215; and Okeke 
v. State (2003) 15 NWLR (Part 842) 73-74 (“Any objection of a charge of any formal defect on the 
face thereof shall be taken immediately after the charge has been read over to the accused not later”).  
2 S. 260 (2). 
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the process of objecting to the charge or the jurisdiction of the court in order to 
ensure that his client’s interests are well protected. This must be done without 
compromising the integrity of the court, bearing in mind always that the (counsel) 
at all times is a minister in the temple of justice. There is the need to avoid 
Criminal trials where such trials are avoidable or unnecessary. There is however 
the need for uniformity of rules and principles on quashing information and 
charges. 
 
4.4. Interlocutory Appeals and Stay of Proceedings 
Appeals against final and interlocutory decisions of the courts are rights conferred 
and recognised by the Constitution. While appeals against final decisions of trial 
courts are exercisable as of right, appeals against interlocutory decisions are not 
usually as of right. In some interlocutory appeals, especially appeals against 
decisions on facts and mixed law and facts, leave of the trial court or of the Court 
of Appeal as the case may be must first be sought and obtained before the appellant 
can appeal. 
Interlocutory appeals in criminal process can arise where there is a decision on an 
application to quash a charge or information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of 
trial court to try the charge or on the ground of a formal defect in the charge or 
information. During trial, interlocutory appeals may arise where defence counsel 
takes the view that material evidence has been wrongly admitted or wrongly 
excluded. An interlocutory appeal may also arise where the trial court either 
outright refuses to grant bail to the accused person or grants bail to the accused 
person under harsh conditions. Finally, an interlocutory appeal may arise where 
defence counsel opines that trial judge wrongly overruled a no-case submission 
with the result that the accused is directed by the court to open his defence. 
In cases where the need to file an interlocutory appeal arise, defence counsel are 
frequently confronted with the issue of whether to appeal as of right or seek the 
prior leave of the court before appealing. This has to be resolved against the 
backdrop of a proper knowledge of the constitutional provisions on appeals and 
decided cases. It is trite that where leave to appeal is required and it is not obtained 
prior to the appeal, the appeal is incompetent and liable to be struck out. Another 
challenge confronting defence counsel in a case where there is an interlocutory 
appeal is whether to allow the substantive case to proceed to trial or halt the trial 
through application to stay proceedings pending the determination of the appeal. It 
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is evident that where stay of proceedings is granted, trial is halted until the appeal 
is determined either by the Court of Appeal or the apex Court.    
In view of the congestion in appellate courts, an interlocutory appeal may take 3-7 
years before it is determined by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. In the 
interim, the trial judge might have been elevated, retired or even transferred to 
another judicial division of the High Court. The prosecutors and prosecution 
witnesses may also have been transferred. In some cases, witnesses might have 
died. The delay which results from interlocutory appeal is self-evident. Little 
wonder, that defence counsel who apply for stay of proceedings are often accused 
by the court and prosecution of being clogs in the wheel of  speedy determination 
of criminal cases. Therefore, Lagos State and the EFCC Act have demonstrated 
their disapproval of stay of proceedings in all criminal cases by outlawing stay of 
proceedings pending the determination of interlocutory appeals.
1
 
The delay arising from interlocutory appeals and stay of proceedings is 
appreciated.
2
 However, this should not justify a blanket prohibition of a stay of 
proceedings in deserving cases. An accused person who files an interlocutory 
appeal does so in exercise of his constitutional right of appeal. Neither he nor his 
counsel should be stigmatized and perceived as a clog in the wheel of speedy 
disposal of cases. There is need to balance speedy disposal of criminal cases 
against the preservation of rights of the accused persons especially the preservation 
                                                          
1 EFCC Act, s. 40: Subject to the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999, an application for stay of proceedings, in respect of any criminal matter brought by the 
commission before the High Court shall not be entertained until judgment is delivered by the High 
Court. 
2 See EFCC Act, s. 42A.  The frustration of trials through spurious and frivolous interlocutory 
applications remains a major obstacle to criminal prosecution in Nigeria. Defence counsel often file 
such application to delay trials and hope that incriminating evidence would be lost or the prosecution 
might be unable to locate and call vital evidence as time goes by. The ploy also requires the defence 
counsel to ask for a stay of proceeding pending the outcome of the Appeal. It is gratifying to note 
however that the EFCC Act has addressed this problem by barring interlocutory appeals. In support of 
this provision Prof. Osinbajo argued that: 
“Interlocutory appeals on practically any issue have remained a major hindrance to early disposition 
of cases especially as it almost always involves a stay of proceedings of the court appealed from. In 
criminal cases in Lagos State and under the EFCC laws, stay of proceedings in such circumstances is 
prevented by law. Constitutional amendments providing for the termination of interlocutory appeals 
at the Court of Appeal is much needed. There need also be clear and definitive intervention by the 
Supreme Court on notorious and recondite issues frequently deployed to delay trials. Issues of 
jurisdiction require one clear Supreme Court decision which lays down the principles and the law:” Y. 
Osinbajo, 2The Retreat of the Legal Process” (being a paper presented by Professor Yemi Osinbajo, 
SAN, at the 2011 Founder”s Day lecture of the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 17 
March 2011). 
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of the res of appeal and prevent the appeal being rendered nugatory due to trial of 
the case during the pendency of the appeal. There is also the need to avert 
avoidable criminal trials of accused persons against whom incompetent 
information have been filed by the prosecutor. A meaningful equilibrium should 
therefore be struck between speedy disposal of cases and preserving the res of the 
appeal. We respectfully submit that where the interlocutory appeal does not affect 
the merit of the substantive trial, for example, interlocutory appeals against refusal 
to grant bail, stay of proceedings should not be granted.  However, where the 
interlocutory appeal is against refusal to quash the charge or appeal against 
overruling of a no-case submission, proceedings should be stayed and trial halted 
in order to prevent needless criminal trial. 
 
4.5. Presumption of Guilt, Interim Attachment of Property  and Forfeiture of 
Assets 
As indicated above, the presumption of innocence enjoyed by accused persons and 
the burden imposed on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt are the twin pillars of the adversary criminal process. Under the 
adversary system, the accused is presumed innocent of the crime alleged against 
him. Consequently, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the crime alleged 
against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And if at the end of the case, there is 
doubt whether the accused committed the offence or not, such doubt must be 
resolved in his favour and he is in such a situation entitled to an acquittal. 
The adversary trial process, undoubtedly, protects the accused persons at the 
expense of the state and victims of offences. It was against this backdrop, that 
proposals were made on shifting of the burden of proof in some cases to the 
accused persons. Some of the anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws 
adopt these proposals.
51
 For Example, where the assets of the accused person 
exceed his known legitimate income, the burden is on the accused to prove that the 
excess assets were not acquired corruptly or through economic and financial 
crimesWhere the prosecution establishes a prima facie evidence that funds in the 
account of a suspect or properties belonging him or her are purchased with the 
proceeds of financial crime, the court on the application of the prosecution is 
empowered to make interim order freezing the bank account into which funds 
suspected to be proceeds of financial crimes are paid pending the conclusion of 
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investigation or trial of such suspects.
1
 The court is also empowered to make 
forfeiture order in respect of real properties suspected to have been acquired with 
the proceeds of economic or financial crime.  
If at the end of the trial, the accused is adjudged liable, such funds and properties 
are liable to forfeiture order. The proceeds of such properties and funds if forfeited 
are transferred to the federation account. The underlying principle is to make 
financial crimes unprofitable to offenders. The strategy is to prevent convicts who 
have served their prison terms from returning back to the society and enjoy the 
proceeds of the crime. The above provisions of the EFCC Act and other similar 
provisions are definitely right steps in the right direction. They however pose 
challenges to defence counsel who defend accused persons whose assets are, to the 
knowledge of the public, subject of interim attachment Such defence counsel are 
usually perceived by the public as accomplices of accused persons who are already 
adjudged guilty of the crime charged by members of the public. In some cases, 
assets not belonging to the accused person are deliberately included by the 
prosecution in the list of assets which are to be affected by the forfeiture order. In 
other cases, the assets are deliberately over-valued by the prosecution in order to 
prejudice members of the public against such suspects. Such suspects are 
consequently condemned in the court of the public even before the commencement 
of trial. Incidentally, defence counsel engaged by accused persons involved in such 
corruption-related cases also share in the condemnation by members of the public.  
They are condemned for accepting the brief to defend such accused persons. In 
cases where bank accounts of accused persons have been frozen, defence counsel 
finds it virtually impossible to be paid their professional fees.  It suffices to add that 
non-payment of counsel professional fees may hinder effective representation of 
the accused by his unpaid counsel. 
 
4.6. Forfeiture of Assets to the Federal Government 
An accused person can be convicted either solely on the strength of his 
confessional statements, plea bargaining or on the basis of the evidence adduced by 
the prosecution against him or her.  A golden thread which is to be seen with 
convictions under the EFCC Act is that where assets and funds are proved by the 
prosecution to be proceeds of financial crimes, they are liable to be forfeited to the 
                                                          
1 See e.g., EFCC Act, s. 34 (1). 
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Federal Government of Nigeria.
1
 The provision on payment of proceeds of sale of 
forfeited assets into the Federation Account assumes that the federal government 
will at all times be the victim of economic and financial crimes. Therefore, on the 
principle of the prevention of unjust enrichment, the restitution to be made by 
accused persons must always be made to the Federal Government. 
However, this is not necessarily true. It should be noted that the activities and 
prosecutorial powers of the EFCC also extend to properties and funds belonging to 
authorities and entities other than the Federal Government including state 
governments, local government councils, banks, and other financial institutions. 
From the view point of the defence counsel, the arrangement whereby funds which 
are proceeds of financial crimes are paid to the Federation Account, in cases where 
the federal government is neither the owner of the funds or a victim of the offence 
will generate discomfort.  
Apart from unjustly enriching the Federal Government, the provision has the effect 
of robbing Peter to pay Paul. A defence counsel involved in advising a suspect on 
plea bargaining may find it difficult to do so when he realizes that the proceeds of 
financial crimes, if confiscated, will be paid into the Federation Account and not to 
the victim of the crime.  Admittedly, the practice has been developed whereby 
arrangements are made by the federal government to return the properties to the 
victim of the offence. The arrangement is definitely commendable. It is however, 
an informal arrangement. Beneficiaries of funds in the Federation Account will 
perfectly be right to challenge the informal arrangement. What is required is a 
specific legislative intervention, authorizing the federal government to release such 
properties or funds to the victims of the crime. 
 
5. Conclusions And Suggestions 
It is evident from the foregoing that the battle against corruption has not progressed 
appreciably. Obviously, the considerable expansion of the frontiers of fighting the 
menace of corruption has yielded little results. As discussed above, there are multi-
dimensional challenges inhibiting the fight against corruption in Nigeria. This can 
partly be ascribed to incompetence of enforcement officers; lack of political will on 
the part of government; and political interference with the work of enforcement 
agencies. 
                                                          
1 See EFCC Act, s. 21. 
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The government should endeavour to provide more resources and operational 
equipment in support of investigators and prosecutors in order to match the ever-
increasing case load of the investigators. This paper holds the view that the 
criminal justice system should be managed in such a way that it will reduce the 
effect of media/ public trial on the accused and the pressure it places on the 
prosecutor to secure conviction by all possible means. A system of case selection 
and evaluation should be put in place, involving very experienced prosecutors and 
senior advocates, in order to ensure that only very promising cases are charged to 
court. Efforts should also be made to observe and respect all the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of accused persons.  
The government at all levels should generate awareness aimed at arresting the 
prevailing culture of corruption in Nigeria. The masses need to be educated on the 
limitless, negative and devastating consequences of corruption.
1
 
This paper has argued that plea bargaining has been used effectively in some 
countries, as a tool for quick and effective resolution of corruption cases. The paper 
also examined the argument in favour and against the continued use of plea 
bargaining in Nigeria. We wish to emphasize that for plea bargaining to have the 
desired effect, it must be properly incorporated and well structured within the 
Nigerian legal framework. The use of plea bargaining should be properly regulated 
by the National Assembly. It should be used only in deserving cases, in the public 
interest, and in the interest of justice. To prevent abuse, a committee should be set 
up under the supervision of the Attorney-General to consider the application of 
plea bargaining in deserving cases. It also must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner, irrespective of class, and status.   
It is also important for the various tiers of government to deal with credibility crisis 
in the administration of criminal justice. It is unfair for government agencies to 
intimidate and harass politically exposed persons with criminal prosecution. This is 
always the case when suspects are arrested, detained, handcuffed, and numerous 
and unsubstantiated charges made against them, while the investigating bodies play 
to the public gallery. The suspect is detained for unreasonable length of time and 
his pre-trial rights taken away from him. This process is vulnerable to abuse, as it 
involves the exercise of huge discretion by low ranking officers. 
                                                          
1 They include armed conflicts, civil strife, child trafficking, prostitution, capital flight, loss of 
investments, underdevelopment, medical tourism, loss of national culture etc. 
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For quick and effective dispensation of criminal justice in Nigeria, these are urgent 
issues the government must address. There is a need for uniformity of rules in 
quashing charges against suspects. It is only reasonable that where frivolous 
charges are brought against a suspect, his counsel should have the right to invite 
the court to quash the charges at the earliest opportunity.  
It is also imperative that the issues concerning interlocutory appeals and stay of 
proceedings be addressed. A blanket prohibition of interlocutory appeals is not in 
the interest of justice. A balance must be struck between speedy trial and the 
protection of the constitutionally guaranteed right of suspects. Again, there should 
be a detailed procedure on the interim attachment and forfeiture of the assets of the 
accused. The accused is innocent until proven guilty. Hence, he must be allowed 
access, even if it is a restricted access, to his bank account and assets.   
It is suggested that proceeds of confiscated assets should be forfeited to the victims 
of crime and not the federal government. The current position is that all funds 
which are proceeds of financial crimes are paid into the Federation Account. This 
amounts to unjust enrichment of the Federal Government.   
Finally, government at all levels should join hands to fight corruption. 
Government should explore the idea of creating special corruption courts manned 
by fearless and incorruptible judges. The court should receive additional resources 
and protection; adjournment of cases should be discouraged at all cost. 
It is hoped that the adoption of the above strategy would catalyse: 
(i) more convictions on corruption cases, and consequently a reduction in 
corrupt practices. 
(ii) transparency in the conduct of public business and national development in 
all ramifications. 
(iii) the rethinking of the utility of plea bargaining procedure in the criminal 
justice system. 
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